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THE COLORIZATION OF BLACK-AND-WHITE
MOTION PICTURES: A GREY AREA
IN THE LAW
Michael B. Landau*
[Iff [works] command the interest of the public, they have a
commercial value .... [1]t would be bold to say they have not
an aesthetic and educational value.., the taste of any public is
not to be treated with contempt.
Mr. Justice Holmes'
I. INTRODUCTION
In an attempt to exploit new markets, and to resurrect and allegedly
revitalize many old black-and-white films, several firms, through a pro-
cess known as "colorization" 2 or "color conversion,"3 are adding color
to hundreds of old black-and-white films.' Highly computerized, the pro-
cess is expensive, arduous and, according to those who do it, artistically
creative.5 Some of the films that have been colorized, the firms admit,
* B.A. 1975, Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1988, University of Pennsylvania. Mr.
Landau is an attorney associated with the firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore in New York. An
earlier version of this Article received the "Nathan Burkan Memorial Copyright Award"
sponsored by ASCAP at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1988.
The Author would like to thank Leslie Kyman for her patience and expertise at the word
processor.
1. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
2. See Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 29, 1987, (Sunday Magazine), at 14. "Colorization" is
the term and trademark used by Colorization, Inc., a subsidiary of Hal Roach Studios. As its
subsidiary, Colorization, Inc. has access to the studio's entire library of black-and-white films.
Id.
3. Id. "Color conversion" is the term used by Color Systems Technologies, Colorization,
Inc.'s main competitor. Color Systems Technologies does the colorization work for Ted Tur-
ner. Id The term "colorization" will be used in this Article to refer to the process of adding
color to films.
4. Id
5. Representatives of Color Systems Technologies describe the conversion process as
follows:
It is not the computer that colors unassisted, but rather, a large staff of opera-
tors, including artists and researchers, who make numerous subjective choices....
The coloring process begins with a transfer of the film to video tape on a shot-by-shot
basis. Each shot is broken down with respect to such elements as costumes and sets,
and the art department researches the film for factors of historical significance, as
well as for tone and color. Representative 'story boards' are colored by the art de-
partment to guide the actual color conversion, which also takes place under the su-
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are classics,6 while others are not.7 In either case, major commercial in-
terests view colorization as a monumental profit-making opportunity.8
The United States Copyright Office has recently chosen to grant sep-
arate copyright protection to colorized versions of black-and-white mo-
tion pictures as derivative works. 9 There has been much criticism of this
decision, as well as a plethora of criticism of the colorized versions of the
films in general. 10 In the autumn of 1986, the Copyright Office requested
pervision of the art department. The final product must meet the approval of the
highly credentialed artists on the color conversion staff, as well as the client.
23 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 493 (Aug. 28, 1980).
Wilson Markle of Colorization, Inc. describes Colorization's process as follows:
It all begins with a client's delivering a "broadcast quality" black-and-white
videotape of the best available copy of a given film. Certain imperfections caused by
wear and tear of film stock can be cleaned from the videotape, but others will find
their way into the colorized version.
Research and continuity people then break the film down into scenes. Studio
stills, production notes, old movie magazines and other sources are consulted to
glean available information on costumes, sets, hair and eye color. Some things can be
found out, and some things can't.... Next an art director and a "strategy colorist"
decide what shades go where.
They have hints from the black-and-white tape.... They know that if two tones
in two parts of the frame are equally dark, those two colors are equally dark. But
there's no way they can look at those shades of gray and know what colors they
really are. So they use their artistic sense. And when they have made their decisions,
the thing gets turned over to the animation colorists.
Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 29, 1987, (Sunday Magazine), at 16.
Since "true artistic merit" has been listed as a criterion for originality by the Second
Circuit in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976), the parties in-
volved would characterize their processes as artistic, original and creative. See supra notes 36-
105 and accompanying text.
6. It's a Wonderful Life (RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 1947), Casablanca (Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer 1942), and The Maltese Falcon (MGM/UA 1941) have all been colorized. Id. at 16.
7. Ted Turner has purchased 3,650 old black-and-white films. Id. It is hard to imagine
that most of them could be considered classics.
8. See id Ted Turner paid $1.2 billion to MGM for its library of 3,650 movies, including
many films made by Warner Brothers and RKO. Id Turner has hired Color Systems Tech-
nologies to put color on more than one hundred of these films, to be broadcast over Turner's
satellite "super station," offered in syndication and available on videotape. Id.
9. The colorized version of Frank Capra's It's a Wonderful Life was the first motion
picture to receive a separate copyright. Id. at 14.
10. Id at 16. The criticism often comes from the creative forces behind the original black-
and-white versions of the films. Id
Frank Capra, then 87, wrote a letter to the Library of Congress urging that the copy-
right request be denied. "I chose to shoot [the movie] in black-and-white film," the
director said in his letter. "The lighting, the makeup for the actors and actresses, the
camera and laboratory work, all were geared for black-and-white film, not color. I
beseech you with all my heart and mind not to tamper with a classic in any form of
the arts. Leave them alone. They are classics because they are superior. Do not help
the quick-moneymakers who have delusions about taking possession of classics by
smearing them with paint."
I d; see also N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1986, § 3, at 36 (John Houston expressed his negative reac-
tion to the colorized version of The Maltese Falcon).
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that interested parties send comments to assist it in developing practices
regarding the registration of colorized black-and-white motion pictures.'1
The Office requested information regarding the technical processes in-
volved, the nature of artistic decisions made, and the commercial intent
of the "authors." 12 Ultimately, on June 22, 1987, the Copyright Office
decided to grant separate protection to colorized films, provided they
possess "sufficient originality."'1
3
The Copyright Office was justifiably in a quandary. The coloriza-
tion of motion pictures involves fundamental and pivotal questions of
copyright law: is there sufficient originality in a colorized motion picture
to qualify it for copyright protection as a derivative work; 4 a great deal
of the colorizing process is done by computer-is it thus an unprotected
process 1 or a protected expression of an idea; 16 are there policy reasons
for not granting the colorized version separate protection? Because of
inconsistent holdings in the courts and the nebulousness of certain copy-
right standards, these questions are difficult to answer.
The present copyright law apparently would tend to favor the
copyrightability of colorized versions of classic motion pictures. This
Article addresses fundamental principles of copyright law as they relate
to colorization of motion pictures, and attempts to arrive at sensible
answers.
II. COLORIZED MOTION PICTURES AS DERIVATIVE WORKS:
BASIC PRINCIPLES
Section 102(a)(6) of Title 17 of the United State Code authorizes
copyright protection for motion pictures and other audiovisual works. 7
In particular, section 101 of Title 17 defines the categories of audiovisual
works that are capable of protection under the Copyright Act:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of re-
11. Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) No. 100, at 1 (Sept. 30, 1986).
12. Id.
13. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,442-3 (Feb. 4, 1987); see also 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 214, 222 (1988). See infra notes 36-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
"orginality" requirement.
14. See, eg., L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 491.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
16. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982). Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act sets forth the allow-
able subject matter of copyrights:
[C]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
oped, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
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lated images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by
the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or
electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if
any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied. 8
Motion pictures are a subcategory of audiovisual works and are defined
in section 101 of the Copyright Act as "audiovisual works consisting of a
series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an im-
pression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any." 19
Clearly, colorized versions of motion pictures are themselves audiovisual
works falling under the definition set forth in section 101.
In determining whether a colorized version of a black-and-white
motion picture is capable of receiving its own copyright protection, it is
important to examine the definition of "derivative works" in the Copy-
right Act. Section 101 defines derivative works:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preex-
isting works, such as a translation, ... motion picture, . . . or
any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole represent
an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
'2 0
It would thus appear, if the requisite quantum of originality is met,
that a colorized version of a motion picture is a derivative work-the
colorized version would certainly be a recasting, transformation or modi-
fication as defined by the statute.21 That the underlying motion picture
movie upon which the derivative work is based has fallen into the public
domain is of no consequence.22 A work may be copyrightable though it
is based upon material already existing in the public domain, if the au-
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include
the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
Id. § 102(a).
18. Id. § 101.
19. IdL
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id. at § 103(b). Section 103(b) provides that the copyright in a derivative work is
independent of any copyright protection in the preexisting material. Id.
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thor, by virtue of his own skill and effort has contributed a distinguish-
able variation from the previous existing materials.23
The area in dispute in the copyrightability of colorized motion pic-
tures is whether the colorization represents an "original work of author-
ship" as required by the Copyright Act.24 Under the "distinguishable
variation" test, it would appear that the requisite originality is met, for
an ordinary lay observer would clearly notice the difference between the
colorized version and the black-and-white version. By colorizing the
film, the colorizer has contributed a distinguishable variation from the
previously existing black-and-white movie. If the colorizer is successful
in satisfying the originality requirement, the colorized movie would be a
derivative work eligible for protection under section 103(a) of the Copy-
right Act.25
The protection that would attach to the derivative work is limited; it
would "extend[ ] only to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the [un-
derlying] work."' 26 The underlying work-the black-and-white film-
would still be protected by its own separate copyright.27 Therefore, if
protection is granted, it would only extend to the specific colorization of
the film. Additionally, even if copyright were granted to the colorized
version, under section 103(b) the original black-and-white films would
still enter the public domain upon the expiration of their copyrights.28
The duration of the copyright in the colorized version would not affect
23. Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), ceit
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (emphasis added).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). For copyright protection to subsist, the material must be an origi-
nal work of authorship. Id.
25. Id. § 103(a). "The subject matter of copyright... includes compilations and deriva-
tive works .... ." Id
26. Id. § 103(b); see also Knickerbocker Toy Corp. v. Winterbrook Corp., 554 F. Supp.
1309, 1317-18 (D.C.N.H. 1982); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660-61 ("The most important point here is
one that is commonly misunderstood today: copyright in a 'new version' covers only the mate-
rial added by the later author, and has no effect one way or the other on the copyright or
public domain status of the preexsting material.").
27. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). In Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1979) a motion
picture of George Bernard Shaw's protected work, Pygmalion, was found to be infringing, for
most of its content was that of the underlying play.
28. Section 103(b) expressly states that the duration of the copyright in a derivative work
is independent of the duration of the copyright in the underlying work. Derivative works
created after January 1, 1978 will have a basic duration of the life of the creator and fifty years
after the creator's death. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). At the end of this period, the derivative work
will enter the public domain.
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the duration of the copyright in the underlying black-and-white film.29
Thus, it would be possible for there to be a public domain black-and-
white film-that anyone could use, display or from which to make a de-
rivative work-and a protected colorized version, both existing
simultaneously.
It is also clear that under present copyright law, a derivative work
could not be made from a copyrighted black-and-white film without the
copyright owner's permission.3" According to Professor Nimmer, when
the underlying work is copyrighted, the derivative work is "saved from
being an infringing work only because the borrowed or copied material
was taken with the consent of the copyright owner."31 Using the under-
lying black-and-white film without permission would clearly be an in-
fringement of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.32 Thus, unless the
black-and-white movie is in the public domain, the colorizer must obtain
the film owner's permission before preparing a colorized version.
One federal district court has observed that "the mere fact that [a
party] used a matter in the public domain does not in and of itself pre-
clude a finding of originality, since [a party] may have added unique fea-
tures to the matter so as to render it copyrightable .... ,33 In the case of
colorization of motion pictures, the "unique features" would be the
colorization process. Note that the "unique aspects" of the derivative
work must themselves be nontrivial or the originality requirement will
not be satisfied.34
At present, there are no reported cases of suits brought for infringe-
ment of copyright resulting from colorization. In most instances, those
who are doing the colorizing either own the right to make derivative
works based on black-and-white films or the underlying work has fallen
into the public domain as in the case of Color Systems Technologies'
colorization of Miracle on 34th Street.35
In sum, under the 1976 Copyright Act, if the colorizers either own
the copyright in the underlying work or if the underlyx'g black-and-
white film is in the public domain, the colorized version will be protect-
29. Id § 103(b). See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text for further discussion of
copyright duration in colorized films.
30. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
31. 1 M. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01, at 3-3, 3-4 (1988).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). A copyright owner has the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works.
33. R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., 444 F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). See infra notes 36-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the originality requirement.
35. Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 29, 1987, Sunday Magazine, at 14.
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able as a derivative work provided the colorization process satisfies the
originality requirement.
III. SUFFICIENT ORIGINALITY
A major issue in the copyrightability of colorized films is the satis-
faction of the sufficient originality requirement.3 6 Section 102(a) of the
1976 Copyright Act provides that "copyright protection subsists, in ac-
cordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tan-
gible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."3" Nowhere in copyright
jurisprudence does there exist a more nebulous and potentially undefina-
ble term than "originality." The statute does not define originality; no-
where in the statute are the requirements of originality set out.
Originality is not dependent on the aesthetic merit of a work.38
Case law lends only confused meaning to the term "originality." In
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,39 the Supreme Court ,of the
United States reversed the denial of a copyright to a circus advertising
poster.40 The court of appeals4" and the dissent in the Supreme Court
did not deem an advertisement to be artistic enough to warrant copyright
protection.42 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes focused not on
the skill of the artist or the aesthetics of the work, but on originality.43
The Court declared that courts should not be the arbiters of aesthetics, or
determiners of "what is art."' Justice Holmes stated: "It is not for the
court to substitute its taste for that of the public .... No matter how
poor artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it is his own. '
Since artistic merit or aesthetics is not the determining factor of
originality for copyright protection, what does "originality" mean? Dif-
ferent cases have set different standards, but all are vague and difficult to
follow. 46  As a result, there are no reliable guidelines for the courts to
36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660-61.
39. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
40. Id. at 250.
41. Courier Lithography Co. v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 104 F. 993 (6th Cir. 1900).
42. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 249-50.
44. Id. at 250.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) ("even a
modest degree of originality" is enough); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-
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follow. The required quantum of originality has been variously defined
as a "substantial, but not merely trivial" originality,47 a "distinguishable
variation,"" a "minimal element of creativity over and above the re-
quirement of independent effort,"'49 a "very modest grade of original-
ity,""0 and as "sufficiently dissimilar" from another work."1 With
standards such as these, it seems as though "originality" is as difficult to
define as "love" or "beauty." The cases appear to be fact-specific and
sometimes result oriented. In fact, Judge Learned Hand stated that in
the area of copyright, "[d]ecisions must ... inevitably be ad hoc." 2
In Durham Industries,3 three-dimensional wind-up toy replicas of
two-dimensional Walt Disney characters were denied copyright protec-
tion as derivative works on the grounds that the figures lacked "even a
modest degree of originality."54 Yet, in TV Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Ac-
tion Industries,55 a New York federal court held that "artists... who
[have] translated.., sketches [and drawings] into three-dimensional art
works have added sufficient creative effort to make the... figures pro-
tectible under the copyright laws" as derivative works.5 6
Adding to the confusion, the Second Circuit, in Alfred Bell,
5 7
granted a separate copyright to an exact reproduction, albeit in a differ-
ent medium, of a public domain old master painting. 8 In granting a
copyright to the mezzotint engravings, the court defined original as
something that "owes its origin to the author," and continued that "no
large measure of novelty is necessary." 9 The court stressed "that noth-
91 (2d Cir. 1976) (originality requires "true artistic skill" and a recognizable contribution of
the author); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
("original" means owing its origin to the author; no novelty is required).
47. Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945).
48. Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
49. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 102, at 36.
50. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
51. Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
52. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
54. Id at 911.
55. 589 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
56. Id at 767. But see L. Batlin & Son, 536 F.2d at 492 (translation to another medium is
not protectable originality).
57. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
58. Id at 102.
59. Id The Alfred Bell court explained in depth the constitutional background of the
copyright statute, and the difference between the requirement for patents, novelty and unique-
ness, and copyright originality. Id. at 100-03. The court held that the standard for copyright
is less stringent than that for patents. Id. at 102-04; see also Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,
177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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ing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly
unique or novel."'  Alfred Bell also reinforces the idea that a copyright
may be granted to works derived from public domain works.61 The court
stated that:
[W]e were not ignoring the Constitution when we stated that a
"copy of something in the public domain" will support a copy-
right if it is a "distinguishable variation" . . All that is
needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that
the "author" contributed something more than a "merely triv-
ial" variation.62
The colorization of a motion picture would certainly seem to satisfy the
merely trivial variation requirement. In Alfred Bell, just as with film
color, the new work was essentially the same as the old master, but in a
different medium and copied with exacting certitude.63
The Alfred Bell court also expressed concern over blocking of future
works by future artists" by stating that "[t]he 'author' is entitled to a
copyright if he independently contrived a work completely identical with
what went before; similarly, although he obtains a valid copyright, he has
no right to prevent another from publishing a work identical with his, if
not copied from his."'65 If this were not so, a copyright owner could
monopolize a work to the same extent that a patent owner could without
having to go through the rigorous requirements of patent registration.
Later cases also suggest the notion that the standards of originality
or "original contribution of the author" are relatively low.66 In Eden
Toys, a modest and minor variation of an illustration of a Paddington
Bear was given copyright protection.67 The bear with "changed propor-
tions of the hat, elimination of individualized fingers and toes, [and] the
overall smoothing of lines" created a "different [and] 'cleaner' look."68 It
was therefore a distinguishable variation from the underlying work.69 In
Blazon, the court assumed a hobby horse could be copyrightable since
the plaintiff could have added "unique features to the horse, enlarged it
60. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102.
61. Id. at 102-03.
62. Id
63. Id. at 105.
64. Id. at 103. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text for discussion of the impact
on later works by future artists.
65. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103.
66. See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982);
Blazon, Inc. v. DeLuxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
67. Eden Toys, 697 F.2d at 34-35.
68. Id. at 35.
69. Id
1169
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and made it sufficiently dissimilar from defendant's horse as to render it
copyrightable ... "70
Minimal differences in fabric design,71 toy snowmen,72 theatrical
and musical works,73 and video games74 have all been granted separate
copyright protection. The courts in these cases have accepted any distin-
guishable variation resulting from an author's independent creative en-
deavor as constituting sufficient originality to confer copyright
protection.7" Under this standard, the deliberate creative addition
76 of
color to a black-and-white film would probably be eligible for protection
as a copyrightable derivative work.
Although the lack of an objective definition of originality in the 1976
Copyright Act has caused problems that were clearly foreseeable when it
was enacted, Congress purposely omitted a definition because it desired
to continue the standard established by the 1909 Act.77 The House Re-
port stated that the originality "standard did not include requirements of
novelty, ingenuity, or [a]esthetic merit... [and] there [is] no intention to
enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them."' 78  Con-
gress sought to endow authors with protection for even minimal addi-
tions to a preexisting work. Thus, the addition of color to motion
pictures should be considered to be a sufficient addition to satisfy the
Act's originality requirement.
The courts in the previously described cases have required the "au-
thor" to meet a rather minimal standard of "originality. '79 However,
reflecting the lack of a concrete statutory definition of the term, other
courts have applied a much stricter standard and have denied copyright
protection for original, but slightly different, derivative works. For ex-
70. Blazon, 268 F. Supp. at 422.
71. See, e.g., Covington Fabrics Corp. v. Artel Prods. Inc., 328 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1971); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, 295 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 415
F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969).
72. Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982).
73. Leeds Music Ltd. v. Robin, 358 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Brecht v. Bentley, 185
F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Brecht dealt with the separate copyrightability of a translation
of a theatrical work. Section 103(b) of the Copyright Act allows a copyright for a derivative
work in a translation. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
74. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986).
75. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 438; Eden Toys, 675 F.2d at 500-01; Leeds Music Ltd.,
358 F. Supp. at 659-60; Covington Fabrics Corp., 328 F. Supp. at 204; Peter Pan Fabrics, 295 F.
Supp. at 1368; Brecht, 185 F. Supp. at 894.
76. See supra note 5.
77. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5664.
78. Id
79. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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ample, in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,8" an authorized painting based
on frames from the movie The Wizard of Oz was denied copyright pro-
tection for lack of sufficient originality."1
In L. Batlin & Son, 2 the court removed copyright protection from a
plastic version of a public domain metal "Uncle Sam Bank."8 3 Although
the court quoted the originality standards of Alfred Bell, it added the
standard of "true artistic skill"84 to the recognizable contribution of the
author .85 The addition of "true artistic skill" seems to contradict the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bleistein that the courts should not be con-
cerned with artistic merit. In Bleistein, Justice Holmes asserted:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At one extreme some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation.... At the other end, copy-
right would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public
less educated than the judge.86
Has not a court acted as an arbiter of aesthetics if it determines "true
artistic skill" in its decision? With a standard of true artistic skill, a con-
servative judge in the 1950's might have ordered copyright protection
removed from the works of Jackson Pollack, Ellsworth Kelly, or Franz
Kline for lack of sufficient originality.87 In Past Pluto Productions Corp.
v. Dana,8 8 a case similar to Batlin, the court refused to allow green foam-
rubber Statue of Liberty hats to be copyrighted because of a lack of origi-
80. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
81. Gracen, 698 F.2d at 305. The decision to deny copyright protection reflected the
court's concern over future artists copying from subsequent copies rather than the original. Id
The court envisioned great difficulty in discerning the various artist's rights in multiple copy
situations. Id. To avoid confusion, the court chose to deny copyright protection to the copies.
Id.
82. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986).
83. Id at 492.
84. Id. at 491.
85. Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 ("All that is needed is ... that the 'author' contributed
something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own.' ").
86. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52.
87. For those unfamiliar, Pollack, Kelly, and Kline are/were painters from the New York
School of Abstract Expressionism. Pollack was famous for his "splatter paintings" in which
paint would drip on a canvas in a planned but random fashion. Kelly painted a number of
totally monochrome canvasses. Kline painted broad black strokes oh white backgrounds with
housepaint. It could also be argued that the abstract expressionist copyrights should not have
been granted protection under the doctrine of idea-expression merger. For a discussion of the
doctrine of idea-expression merger, see infra notes 124-38 and accompanying text.
88. 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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nality.89 The court declined to find any "non-trivial originality deserving
of protection under the federal copyright laws."90
Holding that a green foam seven-inch crown is not sufficiently differ-
ent from the enormous actual oxidized copper crown in New York Har-
bor is an absurdity. What the courts are really saying in cases like Batlin
and Past Pluto is that they will not allow public domain American icons
such as Uncle Sam and the Statue of Liberty to be monopolized by profit
hungry manufacturers. The courts should have expressed their policy
motives instead of expanding or misinterpreting previous copyright stan-
dards, thereby causing doctrinal confusion.91
In M. Kramer Manufacturing, Inc. v. Andrews,92 a video game case,
the court distinguished Batlin by relying on the language of the Copy-
right Act. 93 TheM. Kramer court then focused on use of the "true artis-
tic skill" standard and limited it specifically to "works of art."' 9 The
court stated that:
It is true that Batlin does use the phrase "true artistic
skill," but it was using it in connection with a copyright issued
for a "work of art." No doubt the language was appropriate in
that connection but it is not relevant where the work is copy-
righted as "audiovisual works." 95
The definition of "audiovisual works" in section 101 and its interpreta-
tion in the decisions plainly differs from that of a "work of art" in the
act.96 Motion pictures are a subclassification of audiovisual works. 97
The M, Kramer court moved to a more relaxed standard of originality
with respect to subject matter other than "works of art" as expressed in
previous cases. 98
89. Id at 1441-42.
90. Id. at 1442.
91. The court in Past Pluto was also concerned with the problem of the first derivative
work "author" or "creator" preventing others from using the same public domain work. Id.;
see also the "Mona Lisa" discussion in Gracen, 698 F.2d at 304, infra note 189 and accompa-
nying text. The author of the first derivative work would argue that the author of the second
derivative work copied the first derivative work and not the underlying work. Thus, the au-
thor of the first derivative work would attempt to sue the author of the second derivative work
for copyright infringement.
92. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
93. Id at 439 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
94. Id. at 439 (citing L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976)). The
"Uncle Sam" bank in Batlin was registered with the Copyright Office as a "work of art."
Batlin, 536 F.2d at 488.
95. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 439.
96. For the definition of audiovisual works, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
98. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 440; see also supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
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In one of the few recent cases involving the copyrightability of a
motion picture derivative work of an underlying motion picture, Interna-
tional Film Exchange, Ltd. v. Corinth Films Inc.," the court held that
there was a separate copyrightable derivative work in an English lan-
guage dubbed or subtitled version of a foreign film, even though the un-
derlying Italian version of the film was in the public domain."c° In
another case, Brecht v. Bentley, °10 a translation of a play was granted
separate protection.I°2 Under the 1976 Act, a translation of a preexisting
work can be copyrightable as a derivative work." 3
Clearly, translating any work requires a significant creative effort.
Translations are not literal; they must be idiomatic. To convey the cor-
rect mood, word choice is crucial. In the case of a dubbed (as opposed to
a subtitled) motion picture, even more creativity is necessary. The crea-
tive team must choose the dubbing actors so that their voices match the
images and personalities of the characters on screen. The words then
must be matched, as closely as possible, to the movements of the screen
actors' lips. It is easy to see how originality is owed to the author in a
dubbed film, and how the translated version would be a distinguishable
variation.
By analogy, the same holds true for the colorized version of a mo-
tion picture. According to those involved in colorizing, the process is
quite creative."° Hundreds of choices regarding color, tone and hue are
made. It is a painstaking process involving many decisions and numer-
ous people. Colorization is thus probably no less creative than transla-
tion. If translations are protected then "recasting" or "modifying" by
colorizing should also be protected. In a colorization, the colorized ver-
sion would owe its origin to the author and to the lay observer would be
a distinguishable variation from the original work. Under most case law,
that is sufficient to qualify for separate protection.'0 5
99. 621 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In International Film, a question arose over
whether an English version of Vittorio de Siea's Ladri di Biciclette (The Bicycle
Thief)(Produzioni de Sica 1948) had a separate copyright. Id. at 632-33.
100. Id at 636; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (regarding translations).
101. 185 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
102. I& at 894.
103. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (derivative works); see also International Film, 621 F. Supp. at
636.
104. See supra note 5.
105. See, e.g., Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.
1927) (distinguishable variation); Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03 (more than a merely trivial
variation).
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IV. COPYRIGHT AND COLOR
There may be Copyright Office regulations that prevent a copyright
from attaching to a colorized version of a work. 10 6 However, these regu-
lations have generally been overlooked in case law. The Copyright Office
regulations regarding registration are contained in two separate sections,
202.1 and 202.21.10 Section 202.1 lists material that is not subject to
copyright:
The following are examples of works not subject to copy-
right and applications for registration of such works cannot be
entertained:
(a) Words and short phrases such as names, titles, and
slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere variations of typo-
graphic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring; mere listing of in-
gredients or contents.108
Section 202.21 provides in pertinent part:
(a) [I]n any case where the deposit of identifying mate-
rial is permitted or required under § 202.19 or § 202.20 of these
regulations for published or unpublished works, the material
shall consist of photographic prints, transparencies, photostats,
drawings, or similar two-dimensional reproductions or render-
ings of the work, in a form visually perceivable without the aid
of machine or device. In the case of pictorial or graphic works,
such material should reproduce the actual colors employed in the
work In all other cases, such material may be in black and
white or may consist of a reproduction of the actual colors. 10 9
The language in section 202. 1(a) and in the last sentence of section
202.21(a) regarding "black and white.., or a reproduction of the actual
colors" could be construed to mean that copyright in black-and-white
versions and copyright in color versions are mutually exclusive. 110 The
copyright applicant can have one or the other. It is interesting to con-
sider whether a photographer, equipped with two cameras, one loaded
with black-and-white film, the other with color film, who simultaneously
106. 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.1, 202.21 (1988).
107. Id The Copyright Office on August 9, 1988 added the requirement that those parties
submitting a colorized version of a work must also deposit a copy of the original black-and-
white version. This requirement is to assist the Copyright Office in determining whether there
is sufficient originality in the colorized version to support an independent copyright. 36 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 370 (Aug. 11, 1988).
108. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at § 202.21 (emphasis added).
110. Id §§ 202.1, 202.21(a).
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photographed the same scene in two versions would be granted separate
copyright protection in both versions under section 202.21.
Although not directly referred to by regulation number, these regu-
lations were probably relied on in Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent Baby Prod-
ucts.'11 In Uneeda Doll, the plaintiff attempted to register two similar,
but slightly differently colored dolls for separate copyrights." 2 The
Copyright Office held that the two dolls were "devoid of copyrightable
difference (since colors are, assertedly, not copyrightable...)."1 3 As a
result, the Copyright Office would only register one of the dolls.
11 4
Similarly, the court in Storm v. Kennington, Ltd. 5 held that black-
and-white illustrations produced from public domain color illustrations
were unprotectable.1 6 However, the process in Storm is distinguishable
from the process of colorization, for it can be argued that it is a less
creative process to delete all color" 7 than it is to engage in all of the
choices involved in coloring movies.
Most courts addressing the color issue seem to neglect or disregard
the regulations entirely. Although the regulations appear to expressly
indicate that colors are uncopyrightable, in Sargent v. American Greet-
ings Corp.,"' in which the plaintiff had added colors to pencil line draw-
ings, the court rejected defendant's argument that additions of "colorper
se does not constitute copyrightable subject matter.""' 9 Similarly, in
Pantone, Inc. v. A. L Friedman, Inc.,"2 ' the court held that Pantone's
mode of expression and arrangement of colors in its booklet of color gra-
dient charts appeared to possess sufficient originality and uniqueness in
its embodiment of its mode of expression to qualify for
copyrightability. 121
Professor Nimmer stated in his treatise that "an original combina-
tion or arrangement of colors should be regarded as an artistic creation
capable of copyright protection."' 122 Nimmer concludes: "[t]hus, adding
colors to a previously black and white picture may constitute an original
111. 355 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
112. IAd. at 441.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 790 (June 25, 1984).
116. Id. at 791-92.
117. Deleting all the color involves but a single choice and a single filtering process.
118. 588 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (coloring children's character "Strawberry
Shortcake").
119. Id. at 918.
120. 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
121. Id. at 548.
122. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.14.
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copyrightable contribution."' 12 3
In the area of copyrightability and sufficiency of originality of
colorization, the cases and the copyright statute lead to confusing results.
There is no clear precedent, and the standard of originality often changes
from case to case. Although it appears that colorized motion pictures are
sufficiently different from the originals and therefore possess the requisite
quantum of originality for separate protection, there is no certainty of
result in this area. More certainty, either in the case law or the copyright
statute, is necessary.
V. PROCESS OR EXPRESSION?
The colorization of black-and-white motion pictures is performed
partly by creative human effort and partly by computer. 124 Each frame
of a movie is not hand colored by an artist with a paintbrush. Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act grants protection to "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."' 125 However, sec-
tion 102(b) denies copyright protection to a "process." 126 The question
then arises, is the colorization of motion pictures an expression or a
process?
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,127 is illustrative
of a number of recent cases in which courts have held that computer
programs128 are not to be denied copyrightability as a "process" or "sys-
tem" precluded from registration under section 102(b). 129 Also, another
court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.,130 stated
that:
[AIll computer programs.., are designed to operate a machine
in such a way as to ultimately produce some useful image to the
user-that is their purpose (i.e., to express). Because of this, the
fact that the works of the program are used ultimately in the
implementation of a process should in no way affect
copyrightability1
31
123. Id.
124. See supra note 5.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
126. Id § 102(b).
127. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
128. Computer programs are classified as "audiovisual works." See Stern Elecs., Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
129. See, eg.,Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1250-51; Atari, Inc. v. North American Phillips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
130. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
131. Id at 780 (emphasis in original).
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A 1976 House Report reinforces this idea by explaining that the copy-
rightable element in a computer program is the expression and that the
underlying method or process is not within the scope of copyright
protection. 132
The holding in M. Kramer Manufacturing, Inc. v. Snyder 133 refers
to the language of the 1976 Copyright Act, which expressly brings within
the standards of copyrightability, communications made "with the aid of
a machine."1 34 As a result, the court found that the expression of a com-
puter program was not precluded from copyright protection under the
provisions of section 102(b).1 35 Professor Nimmer has also concluded
that written computer programs are copyrightable.
136
. Since the computer program utilized to colorize the black-and-white
film is protectable, it can be argued that the colorized version of the film
is also protectable. The colorized film, which results from the commands
of the programmer, the artist, and the computer, is the final expression of
the computer program. If moving "blips" on a video game television
screen, the expression of the computer program, are granted protec-
tion, 137 so should colorized video tapes of black-and-white motion
pictures.
The question then arises, "what about the programmer's participa-
tion?" In the video game context, the Stern court held that the player's
participation does not withdraw the audiovisual work from copyright eli-
gibility.1 31 By analogy, if copyright protection is given to the patterns on
a video screen generated by the interaction of the player with the com-
puter program, copyright protection probably should be given to the col-
ors expressed on a video screen from the interaction of the video artist
and his computer. That the colors are essentially computer generated
should not preclude them from protection; nor should they be precluded
because they are not purely computer generated.
VI. IDEA-EXPRESSION MERGER
The protection afforded by a copyright extends only to the particu-
lar expression of an idea, not to the idea itself.1 39 In some cases, how-
132. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660-61.
133. 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
135. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 435.
136. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.04[c].
137. M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 435.
138. Stem, 669 F.2d at 856; see also M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 437.
139. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
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ever, the idea and the expression coincide. This occurs when the
expression provides nothing new over the idea."4 In copyright law, this
phenomenon is known as the doctrine of idea-expression merger.
14 1
When there is merger of the idea and the expression in a work, no copy-
right will issue. 42 Additionally, copyright protection will not be granted
to the expression of an idea if the idea behind the expression is such that
it can be expressed in only a very limited number of ways.1 43 This is to
prevent an author from monopolizing an idea merely by copyrighting
one of the very limited number of ways of expressing the idea.
The doctrine of idea-expression merger was stated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian. 14 The court held
that a jewel encrusted bumble bee pin was an idea that was free to be
copied, and not a protectable expression.1 41 In denying the copyright
owner's infringement claim the court held that "when the 'idea' and its
'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the expression will not be
barred since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would
confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner."
' 146
The concerns in denying protection where there is merger of the
idea and expression are twofold. First, the court does not want to convey
a monopoly to an idea on the first party who happens to copyright one of
the expressions of the idea. 47 Copyright law is not a first in time receives
the monopoly situation, as is patent law. 148 Second, the courts want to
140. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168
(9th Cir. 1977).
141. For a discussion of idea-expression merger, see Francione, Facing the Nation: the
Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
519, 573 n.265 (1986).
142. Id. Courts will deny total protection because mere ideas are not to be protected. See
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1897) (copyrightability of accounting forms); Donald v.
Zack Meyer T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 97
(1971) (copyrightability of guarantee clauses); Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp.
1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (copyrightability of Statue of Liberty bats); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 217 (1954); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
143. Toro Co. v. Railroad Prods., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986). In Morrissey v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967), copyright protection was denied to the wording of a
sweepstakes entry form because of the limited number of ways to express such an idea. Id. at
678-80. The court stated that copyright protection will be denied when "by copyrighting a
mere handful of forms, [a party] could exhaust all possibilities of future use of the substance [of
an idea]." Id. at 678.
144. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
145. Id at 742.
146. Id (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,
379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (Ist Cir. 1967)).
147. See, eg., Alfred Bell Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951).
148. Id
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prevent litigants from bringing infringement lawsuits merely to harass,
and to prevent the potential impediment to the "promot[ion] of [the] use-
ful Arts" '149 that would follow.
One could argue that the colorization of a previously existing black-
and-white motion picture with realistic hair colors, eye colors and flesh
tones, is an "idea" that can only be expressed in a limited number of
ways. It could also be argued that the expression of the idea cannot be
separated from the idea itself; there are only so many shades of blue
skies, green grass, and brown eyes. Because of the limited ways that dif-
ferent parties could express the idea, the idea and expression could be
said to merge, thereby preventing protection from attaching to the
colorized work." °
It is foreseeable that a second party might decide to do a slightly
different, but still realistically colored version of an already colorized
public domain black-and-white film. In that case, the original colorizer
could bring a copyright infringement suit, claiming that the subsequent
colorizer was copying the original colorizer's film and not making a crea-
tive derivative work, independently based on the underlying black-and-
white public domain film. Harassing lawsuits of this type are not one of
the results that the copyright law was enacted to achieve.' 51
On the other hand, if one makes a surreal film using noncorrespond-
ing colors such as green hair, red eyes, orange skin, and purple lips, the
requisite amount of originality would be found and the idea-expression
dichotomy will be clear. There are limitless ways to vary the colors if
they do not have to correspond to those colors occurring in nature!
VII. AESTHETIC CRITICISM, MORAL RIGHTS, THE LANHAM ACT
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Although the primary emphasis of this Article is copyright law and
not trademark or unfair competition, the Lanham Act'52 and the doc-
trine of "moral rights" are briefly discussed in this section.
Much of the criticism relating to the colorization of motion pictures
is aesthetically based.15 3 Some of the most vocal critics of colorized films
149. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
151. See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of duration and harras-
sing lawsuits.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982).
153. 133 Cong. Rec. 77, 1923 (1987). In addressing the House of Representatives, Richard
Gephardt stated that:
Film is a uniquely American art form: we brought it to life, we made it talk, we
used it to address our deepest social concerns. Classic feature films are a vital part of
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are directors and members of the film industry.15 4 It must be recalled,
however, that aesthetic quality is not a copyright issue. 155 Copyright law
deals with "originality" and "expression," not aesthetics.15 6 Thus, aes-
thetic criticism will not prevent a copyright from being issued. If any-
thing, such criticism can be evidence supporting the granting of a
copyright because it points to originality.
Film director Martin Scorsese has stated: "A lot of film directors
use color as a statement. In using a certain color in a frame you create an
emotional and intellectual response in an audience . . . . When you
colorize [the film] you change these responses." 157 Paradoxically, Scor-
sese's statement cuts quite strongly in favor of granting colorized motion
pictures separate copyright protection as derivative works. To para-
phrase him, the ordinary audience member is able to perceive a distin-
guishable variation, a changed response, when viewing a colorized
version of a film. Thus, the colorized version would have sufficient origi-
nality to afford it copyright protection.15 8
Although disenchanted directors and writers cannot bring actions
under the copyright laws if they do not own the copyright in the underly-
ing film, they could bring actions under the Lanham Act for unfair
designation of origin1 59 or under general principles of unfair competition
if they believe that their films have been so changed by colorization that
America's living heritage. They have become one of the most potent voices through
which one generation speaks to the next.
But these voices are now in danger of being muffled and distorted because the
best films in America's library are threatened with colorization. What would our
lives be like without the images we all share from black and white films.
The potential abuses of colorization are endless. How would it be if some busi-
ness executive decided that the start of "The Wizard of Oz" should be colorized, and
the second half "de-colorized"? It would be like giving a disco beat to Louis Arm-
strong's classic jazz recordings, or taking Ansel Adams' photographs of Yosemite,
and coloring the sky blue and the grass green.
Ie
154. See supra note 10.
155. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
156. See, eg., iad at 249-50.
157. ABC News Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 11, 1986, Show No. 1427, Tran-
script at 5). In fact, Martin Scorsese's fim, Raging Bull, (United Artists 1980) was deliber-
ately shot in black-and-white for the cinematic effect of that medium.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982). Section 1125 of the Lanham Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex or use in connection with any goods or
services or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely
to describe or represent the same, and shall cause goods or services to enter into
commerce.., shall be liable in a civil action.., by any person who believes that he is
or is likely to be damaged by the use of such false description or representation.
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they do not accurately represent their creations."6 Unfair competition,
like trademark infringement, is a commercial tort for which an aggrieved
party is due compensation.' 6 ' Unfair competition law protects against
various unfair commercial acts. 62 Examples of unfair competition in-
clude false advertising, copying of a business' name and unfairly benefit-
ting from another's efforts.16 To prevail in the case of motion pictures,
there must be a serious alteration of the film", or a serious misrepresen-
tation to the audience. 6 It is doubtful that colorization would rise to
this level of actionable mutilation or cause this kind of audience confu-
sion. Nevertheless, it could easily be anticipated that vociferous coloriza-
tion critic Woody Allen might bring an unfair competition claim against
anyone who attempted to colorize either Zelig or Manhattan.'66
The 1976 Copyright Act provides authors with separate finite rights,
often referred to as a bundle of rights. 167 However, there are other rights
that relate to artistic creations not recognized by American copyright
law. The United States, unlike many European civil-law countries, does
not recognize the doctrine of "moral rights" in artistic works.' 68 Califor-
160. Trademark law is a subclass of the broader law of unfair competition. Trademark
infringement is one kind of unfair competition. S. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTI-
TIONER'S GUIDE 5 (1987).
161. 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:3 (2d ed. 1984).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Gilliam v. A.B.C., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In Gilliam, an actionable mutila-
tion was found when an American broadcaster excised approximately twenty-seven percent of
the plaintiff's film to make the broadcast suitable for American audiences. Id. at 23-24. But
see Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 363, 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1966) ("im-
plicit in grant of television rights is the privilege to cut and edit").
165. See, eg., Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1978). In Benson, the court granted an injunction to prevent the sale of redubbed versions of a
record made by an early band of which George Benson was a member. The court found that
the record company planned to mislead the public by selling the redubbed records as new
George Benson albums. Id. at 518.
166. However, since these films are still under copyright protection, colorization without
permission would clearly violate the copyright owner's exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute
and make derivative works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3). If the unauthorized colorized version is
also shown to audiences, the copyright owner's exclusive right of public performance would
also be violated. Id. § 106(4).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)(1982) (right to reproduce work); id. § 106(2) (right to prepare de-
rivative work); id. § 106(3) (right to distribute copies of works); id. § 106(4) (right to public
performance); id. § 106(5) (right to public display).
168. The doctrine of moral rights, often referred to as "droit moral," affords an author with
the power to prevent "distortion, mutilation, or misrepresentation of [his] work, and the right
to prevent the use or representation of the author or his work in such a way as to injure his
reputation." N. BoORSTYN, Copyright Law § 4:8 (1981). The moral rights of authors include:
the right to claim authorship of the work in the form created; the right to prevent distortion,
mutilation or misrepresentation of the work; the right to prevent the use of a representation of
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nia and New York have enacted specific moral rights legislation, but
those statutes are worded to exclude motion pictures either explicitly, as
in New York,169 or as "works for hire" and commercial productions, as
in California.
170
Because the copyright laws do not protect authors, artists and other
creators who do not own copyrights, there is less incentive for them to
create.171 Under the law, only copyright owners may bring infringement
actions. 72 Courts, however, have occassionally granted relief to creators
who do not own copyrights under other legal theories such as breach of
contract and unfair competition. 173 For example, in Granz v. Harris, a
record manufacturer omitted eight minutes of a jazz performance from a
twelve inch record so that the performance would fit onto a smaller rec-
ord.1 74 The Granz court held that distribution of the edited version con-
stituted unfair competition because it falsely represented the shortened
record as the work originally presented by the producer, N. Granz. 7'
the author or his work in such a way as to injure his reputation; the right to withhold a work
from publication or display; and the right to withdraw a work from the public. Id. §§ 4:7-4:8.
Although the United States has amended the Copyright Act to make it compatible with the
Berne Convention, Congress has specifically elected not to adopt any of the Convention's pro-
visions relating to moral rights. 7 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 3 (Nov. 3, 1988).
For a detailed discussion of authors' and artists' moral rights and American equivalents, see
Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Creators, 68 TRADEMARK
REP., 244, 245-46; see also Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGs L.J.
1023 (1976); Comment, Protection of Artistic Integrity, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 90 HARV. L. R v. 473 (1976); Comment, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the
Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1940); Comment, The Monty
Python Litigation-of Moral Rights and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1977).
169. N.Y. ARTs & CULT. AxF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
170. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1988) (The California Art Preservation Act). If
the New York and California statutes included motion pictures, they might be faced with the
threat of federal preemption. It could be argued that the right to make a derivative work,
granted by 17 U.S.C. § 103, would preempt any statutory protection which artists may recieve
under state law. In a case of direct conflict such as this, the federal right to make a derivative
work should prevail. See Francione, The California Art Preservation Act and Federal Preemp-
tion by The 1976 Copyright Act-Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 31 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 105 (1984).
171. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). In addition to the creative incentive, "the economic incentive for
artistic and intellectual creations . . . would be... undermined if authors were unable to
prevent mutilation, distortion or misrepresentation" of their works. N. BooRsTYN, supra note
168 § 4:8.
172. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
173. See, eg., Gilliam, 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (editing of television show found to
exceed scope of broadcaster's license); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
174. Granz, 198 F.2d at 588-89.
175. Id Subsequent recording of jazz sessions involving producer N. Granz carry the leg-
end "original sessions produced by N. Granz."
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VIII. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DURATION OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND HARASSING LAWSUITS
Another possible concern in granting protection to colorized motion
pictures is the duration of the copyright protection. For works created
before 1978, copyright protection has a duration of twenty-eight years
with an additional twenty-eight year term if registration is renewed in a
timely manner.176 All existing statutory copyrights in their first twenty-
eight-year term on January 1, 1978, must be renewed or they will expire
on the thirty-first of December of the twenty-eighth year. 177 Upon expi-
ration, all copyright protection will be permanently lost. 178 Under the
1976 Copyright Act, the term of protection for works in their twenty-
eight-year renewal term prior to January 1, 1978 are automatically ex-
tended for an additional nineteen years.179 Therefore, the renewal term
now becomes forty-seven years giving a total protection of seventy-five
years from the date of the original copyright.18 0
Since most black-and-white films were made before 1976,181 and in
most cases before 1945, they are generally either in the public domain or
are in their second term of copyright protection. Many of the older clas-
sics of the 1930's and 1940's will soon enter the public domain, at which
time anyone can have access to and use of the films. For example, if a
black-and-white classic was first copyrighted in 1940 and then renewed,
it will enter the public domain in the year 2015.182 If a separate copy-
right was granted to a colorized version as a derivative work in 1985, it
will have protection until 2060, a time when the underlying film will no
longer have protection.18 3 Once the black-and-white classic enters the
public domain, anyone would be free to make another colorized version.
If a second party decides to produce a different colorized version using
the actual colors as they correspond to nature, it might be difficult to
determine whether the second derivative work was copied from the pub-
lic domain classic or was copied from the first colorized derivative
work.184 Numerous lawsuits that allege infringement and attempt to
176. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1982).
177. Id. §§ 304(a), 305.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id § 305(b).
181. Black-and-white films produced after 1976 were made in black-and-white not because
of the limitations or unavailability of the color medium, but because of the director's creative
decision to make a black-and-white film.
182. 17 U.S.C. § 304.
183. Id § 302.
184. This would lead to the type of confusion that the court in Gracen v. Bradford Ex-
change, 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) was concerned with. Id at 305. The Gracen court feared
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harass and enjoin those who may be creating legitimate copyrightable
works are foreseeable."' For example, the court in Gracen v. Bradford
Exchange 18 6 hypothesized about an artist who makes minor changes in a
reproduction of the Mona Lisa and then sues another artist for copyright
infringement who also produced a changed Mona Lisa. 18 7 According to
the Gracen court:
If the difference between the original and A's reproduction is
slight, the difference between A's and B's reproductions will
also be slight, so that if B had access to A's reproductions, the
trier of fact will be hard-pressed to decide whether B was copy-
ing A or copying the Mona Lisa itself.
188
In cases such as that posited by the Gracen court, there is a danger
that the innocent artist will be blocked from engaging in his or her crea-
tive efforts. This chilling effect would run counter to the promotion of
the useful arts as provided for in the Constitution." 9 It could be argued
that as a policy measure the prevention of harassing lawsuits might be
reason enough for not granting copyright protection to colorized versions
of motion pictures. As Judge Oaks expressed in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder,9 ' "to extend copyrightability to miniscule variations would sim-
ply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers
intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work."' 191
IX. PROPOSAL
The colorization controvery continues. The process and, of course,
its result, have both proponents and opponents. 192 Although the Copy-
right Office presently grants protection to colorized films,9' copyright
protection in any given work, including colorized films, may be revoked
by a court.
194
that such an "entangling" of the various artists' rights would make it difficult or impossible for
a trier of fact to decide whether the subsequent derivative work was derived from the original
or from the first derivative work. Id. The court solved this problem by denying copyright
protection to the derivative work. Id
185. See Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 53-54.
186. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
187. Id at 304.
188. Id
189. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
190. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
191. Id. at 492 (copyright not granted plastic Uncle Sam bank because of lack of sufficient
originality).
192. 133 Cong. Rec. 77, 1922 (1987).
193. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
194. See, eg., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright revoked because of merger of
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Colorization is a new and innovative process. It is also a process
that probably was not contemplated by Congress when it enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976. Congress should be called upon to "take a fresh
look at this technology just as it so often has examined other innovations
in the past." '195 Since the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted, Congress has
made alterations and modifications to address special needs as they have
arisen. 1 96 Specifically, section 117 was added to handle the problems as-
sociated with the sale of computer software, 197 and section 109(b) was
added to deal with the rental of phonograph records.198
Since it is unlikely that Congress foresaw the colorization of black-
and-white films when it enacted the 1976 Act, it should make specific
provision for it now. This would end the uncertainty and confusion, and
would probably prevent countless future copyright litigation battles.199
Additions to the copyright statute might read as follows:
In Favor of Copyright Protection:
Section 101. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a colorization of a black-and-
white audiovisual or graphic work, translation, musical arrange-
ment, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation,
or any other form in which a work may be recast, transferred
or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which as a whole
represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative
work."
Opposed to Copyright Protection:
Section 102(c). In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any change from a black-
and-white pictorial, graphic or audiovisual work to its realistic
representational colors, or to a change from the actual colors to
a black-and-white version thereof.
idea and expression); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (copy-
right protection revoked for lack of originality).
195. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). The Sony Court
also stated, "[t]he direction of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign
of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress." Id. (citing Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)).
196. See, eg., 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(b), 117 (1982).
197. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
198. Id § 109(b).
199. However, there could still be litigation regarding the artistic changes and editing under
the Lanham Act. See supra notes 152-75 and accompanying text.
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As Professor Chafee has stated, "legal rules should be convenient to
handle.... The rules should be certain, readily understood, not unduly
complicated, and as easy as possible to apply." 2"o To this end, Congress
should amend the present Copyright Act to provide a clear rule for the
courts and the Copyright Office to follow.
X. CONCLUSION
Under present copyright law, it is not certain whether colorized mo-
tion pictures should be granted copyright protection-the applicable
standards are unclear. Depending on the degree of originality required,
there may or may not be protection. 20 1 However, under the majority of
cases, the requisite quantum of originality appears to be met and copy-
right protection would be granted to colorized films.2"2
Under the idea-expression analysis, protection would probably not
be granted. 2 3 The expression would be found to be inseparable from the
idea. After all, there are only so many ways that a black-and-white film
can realistically be colored.
Under the computer program line of cases, protection probably
would be granted." The colorized videotape would be found to be
merely the expression of a computer program, and thus copyrightable.
Under a strict reading of the copyright registration regulations re-
garding color,205 it is not clear whether a copyright would be granted;
however, if colorization is determined to be an arrangement of colors,
copyright protection may adhere.20 6
There are also conflicting policy reasons for and against granting
copyright protection to a colorized work. The copyright law and the
Constitution seek to encourage artistic creativity-not hinder it.20 7 Pro-
200. Chafee, Reflections on The Law of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 514 (1945).
The word "rules" here includes statutory and judge-made provisions as well as administrative
regulations. Id
201. See supra notes 36-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the originality
requirement.
202. See, eg., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986); Eden Toys,
Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
203. See supra notes 124-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine of idea-
expression merger.
204. See supra notes 127-3 8 and accompanying text for a discussion of the copyrightability
of expression generated by a computer program.
205. 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.1, 202.21 (1988).
206. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of copyright registra-
tion regulations relating to colors.
207. Artistic creation is encouraged by providing the author, for a limited time, with the
exclusive rights to his work. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
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tection is an incentive to authors and artists to create. If protection is
granted, millions of people will see new artistic creations in the form of
colorized versions of films. In competitive markets, such as television,
the creative and original should be rewarded and encouraged. On the
other hand, since the colorizers have copyright protection now, and
probably for thirty years in the copyright of the underlying films, they
can reap the economic rewards of their investments and efforts. It may
be argued that to extend protection to these works for another seventy-
five years because of a technological advancement might transcend the
bounds of protecting the works "for limited [tlimes" as provided by the
Constitution.2 °" Also, there is nothing to prevent the colorizers in 2059
from developing another technological innovation of "sufficient original-
ity" to lock-up protection for another seventy-five years into the twenty-
second century. By then, most, if not all, of the underlying works would
be in the public domain. If protection is granted, as expressed in L. Bat-
lin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder209 and Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,210 the
danger of harassing copyright infringement suits would loom ahead.211
The simplest solution for the disgruntled home viewer of colorized
classic motion pictures is to turn off the color on the television set. The
film community, however, must find its solace in clarified copyright laws.
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
209. 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976).
210. 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983).
211. See supra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
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